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Do Training Funds Raise the Pace of Training? The Case of Mauritius 
 
 I.  Introduction 
 
One of the most intensively studied issues in labor economics over the past twenty years 
is whether active labor market policies improve economic outcomes.  While the earliest studies 
reviewed by Heckman et al (1999) generally failed to find positive results, more recent reviews 
by Betcherman et al (2004) and Card et al (2010) have found more supportive evidence for the 
most common intervention, training.1  The most successful training programs in both developed 
and developing countries appear to focus on on–the-job or firm-based training.  
A common funding source for the training programs is to tax the firms that are also 
targeted for training programs.   The earliest programs in Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, France and 
the Netherlands began as narrowly focused sectoral training programs in the 1960s and 1970s.  
All represented some form of partnership between unions and firms in a specific sector 
accompanied by government coordination.  The rationale for these funds is a presumption that 
firms under-invest in training in the absence of government intervention.  The most common 
argument is that training increases the value of a worker in many firms and not just one, meaning 
that the firm that invests in training risks losing the investment if the worker is hired away by 
another firm.  Using Becker’s (1993) terminology, the greater the share of the training that is 
general rather than firm-specific, the greater the incentive for firms to free ride on the other 
firms’ investment by raiding their trained workers rather than investing directly.  This rationale 
makes the most sense when there are many firms using similar skills such as in a single industrial 
sector.  The sectoral training agreements common in Europe allow all the firms to agree to pay 
                                                 
1 Classroom and workplace training represent 42% of all active labor market policy in developed countries (Card et 
al , 2010, table 3) and in developing and transition economies (Betcherman etal, 2004, table 4).   
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equally for training through the payroll tax and then share in the benefits, forcing all firms to 
internalize the training externality. 
In developing countries, it is more common for central governments to impose training 
fund programs across sectors without the explicit participation by labor collectives or firms.2  
These policies have been most popular in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa who each 
represent 27% of the total programs reviewed by Johanson (2009).  Because these programs are 
not focused on a common set of skills, they invariably involve cross–subsidization of training 
intensive firms by others and so the justification for the European training programs does not 
hold.  Nevertheless, these programs could address a second possible externality if there are 
returns to scale in the provision of generally valued skills.  By pooling funds through the tax 
system and coordinating training through approved providers or direct government provision, the 
government can lower the unit cost of training.  Absent that coordination, individual firms would 
end up paying much higher prices per unit of training and many would simply forego 
undertaking that expense. 
The rationale for government intervention in the provision of training is much weaker if 
the skills are specific to a single firm.3  There is no incentive for other firms to poach trained 
workers whose skills have no added value outside the firm that provided the training, and so the 
free-rider problem does not exist.  Because the skills are unique, there are no returns to scale in 
the provision of training.  The only plausible rationale remaining for government intervention is 
that firms face liquidity constraints that prevent them from investing efficiently in their workers. 
In that case, it is possible that the public training subsidy will cause firms to invest efficiently in 
their workers.   
                                                 
2 See CEDEFOP(2008) for a summary of European training fund programs. 
3 Even with general skills, the firm might still provide training without government intervention if informationa 
asymmetries or other labor market rigidities make workers immobile (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999). 
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Even if these market failures exist, it is not clear that they are sufficiently large to 
outweigh the inefficiencies caused by a payroll tax that lowers the return to investment if the tax 
is borne by the firm,  or returns to labor supply if the tax is borne by the worker.  Additionally, 
costs associated with collecting taxes and administering the training funds are unnecessary if the 
firms would have invested in training without the program.  However, past studies have not 
examined whether these training fund programs are cost effective.  Johanson’s (2009) 
comprehensive review of 62 national training funds concludes that despite vast amounts spent on 
training, evaluation has been largely anecdotal and limited to assessments of outcomes against 
targeted levels.  This is particularly true in developing countries where studies have yet to 
establish that firms face lower marginal costs of training or increase their training investments as 
a result of the training funds. 
The need for evaluations of training funds is particularly urgent in Sub-Saharan Africa 
which faces the need to accommodate the fastest growing labor force in the world.4  There are 
numerous areas where public dollars could be used to enhance job growth, and so investments in 
training carry a high opportunity cost.  When asked what factors hinder business growth, African 
firms rank insufficient job skills as 11th most important, behind such factors as transportation, 
access to electricity, input costs, access to financing, and political instability.  It is not obvious 
that training is the best use of scarce resources. 
 This paper use the Mauritius Training Fund as a case study of the performance of training 
funds.  We examine whether the firms that engage in training are those that would be predicted 
to train in a standard Becker(1993) model of training or if the training fund alters the incentives 
to train.  Next, we examine the implied patterns of cross-subsidization from the firms paying into 
the system to the firms receiving the training subsidies.  That analysis shows which industries are 
                                                 
4 Statistics cited here are from McKinsey and Company (2012). 
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taxed in order to subsidize others and whether small firms subsidize large firms or vice versa.  
Finally, we examine whether there is any evidence that the training raises labor productivity.   
 We find that the training subsidy does increases training for the smallest firms that would 
not otherwise train without the subsidy.  However, large, capital-intensive, high-wage firms that 
would be expected to have the greatest incentive to train without the subsidy end up paying more 
in taxes than they receive in subsidies.  Furthermore, the subsidies focus on classroom training 
that has the lowest returns rather than on in-house training that has the highest returns in 
evaluations.  We conclude that in Mauritius, for medium and large firms, the adverse effect of 
the tax on training outweighs the incentive effect of the subsidies.  As a result, the training fund 
may well lower rather than raise the incidence of training in the country.  
II.  The Mauritius Training Fund 
 Following the Human Resource Development Act of 2003, all registered firms in 
Mauritius are required to pay a training levy.  The tax is proportional to the firm’s total base 
wage bill, the aggregate of wages paid workers excluding overtime, bonus and benefits.  The 
government then uses this money to reimburse firms for a portion of their training costs.  In 
principle, firms can be reimbursed up to ten times the tax they pay into the training fund.  The 
reimbursement rate falls as the total expenditure on training increases, but the reimbursement can 
still be as high as five times the training levy paid for the most training intensive firms. 
 The stated objectives of the training fund are to (i) promote human resource development 
in line with national economic and social objectives, (ii) stimulate a culture of training and 
lifelong learning at the individual, organizational and national levels for employability and 
increasing productivity; and (iii) provide the necessary human resource thrust for successful 
transformation of the economy into a Knowledge Economy.  Only the last of these is sufficiently 
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concrete to enable an evaluation, suggesting that the program should atypically induce training in 
the technology sector or other sectors that use information technologies. 
 Table 1 presents summary information for firm training using our industry and firm size 
cells.  In all 9 sectors, training intensity rises with firm size.  Propensity to train varies by sector 
between 6-10% for the smallest firms to 23-47% for the largest firms.  Consistent with the stated 
objective to encourage the growth of the knowledge economy, training intensity is highest in 
Information Technology and Finance. 
 Nevertheless, one might expect that such a policy should have induced most firms to 
invest at least modestly in training every year, and yet only 9% participated in FY2008.  One 
problem is that the training subsidy requires substantial paperwork, use of approved trainers, and 
prior approval of the training curriculum.  The training is also subject to minimum participation 
of 10 workers if the training is offered in the workplace.  These restrictions clearly limit the 
potential participation of smaller firms that may not have enough workers to train or sufficient 
expertise to manage the paperwork, consistent with the pattern of training by firm size found in 
Table 1.   
 However, the training fund is not necessarily geared to benefit large firms either.  The 
program focuses on reimbursement for formal training with greater restrictions on training 
offered in firms rather than classrooms.  However, the most common forms of training in 
Mauritius as in other countries are on-the-job and/or in house training (see Figure 1).  Training 
provided by institutions has been declining in importance with firms complaining the skills are 
too generic to meet their needs.  Other types of training such as reimbursement for tuition from 
overseas institutions, for domestic Master’s training, or for bringing in a foreign expert represent 
a small share of disbursements.  And yet it is on-the-job training and in-house training that have 
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been singled out as particularly effective in evaluations conducted in developed, transition, and 
Latin American economies (Betcherman et al, 2004).  
If the training fund is eliminating a market failure due to liquidity constraints that 
constrain firm incentives to train, one would expect the program would have broad participation.  
Instead, Figure 2 shows that taxes levied on firms typically exceeded the training grants 
disbursed, so much so that the training levy was cut in half in FY2009.  Only 9% of the firms 
provided training in the period we examine and the World Bank (2011) estimates that only 20% 
of firms have provided formal training that could qualify for reimbursement in the past.  This 
level of training is below the 30% training incidence for Sub-Saharan Africa reported by 
Johanson (2009). 
Training funds have been underutilized in other developing countries as well, causing the 
funds to be repurposed to other uses (eg Costa Rica, Gabon , Togo, and  Zimbabwe).  In some 
places, the funds were used to create a large government training bureaucracy rather than 
assisting firms (Colombia, Venezuela).  In Mauritius, the number of private training institutions 
is increasing even as their share of training provision is declining and firms are complaining 
about their services. 
 Even if the Mauritius training fund is not fully utilized, it may still increase the 
propensity to train.  To assess that, we need to establish a model of expected training in the 
absence of the government program.  We turn to that next. 
 
III.  Theory  
 Becker’s (1993) theory of on-the-job training provides a useful framework for our 
evaluation, allowing us to predict which firms would participate.  A firm’s incentive to invest in 
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training depends on the anticipated returns to training compared to the opportunity costs and 
direct costs of the training.  Let Ti be a dummy variable that indicates whether the ith firm invests 
in training.  Training will occur if the expected net return from training Ri is positive.  Probability 
that firm i trains is  
Pr (Ti = 1) = Pr (Ri > 0)                                                                  ( 1) 
Ri will take the form 
ܴ௜ ൌ ௜ܰሺߨ െ ߬ሻሾሺ∑ ቀ ଵଵା௥ሻ௧ቁ ሺ ௜ܶ ௜ܹ௧் ൅ ሺ1 െ ௜ܶሻ ଴ܹைሻሿ ൅ ௜ܰሺߨ െ ߬ሻሺ1 െ ௜ܶሻ ଴ܹை୑௧ୀଵ 	   
             െ ௜ܰ ௜ܶ ଴ܹைሺ1 ൅ ߬ሻ ൅	 ௜ܰ ௜ܶሺ ௜ܵ଴் ൅ 	ߝ௜் െ ܥ௜଴்ሻ (2) 
where M represents the firm’s time horizon over which it anticipates employing ௜ܰ  workers.  
The firm earns a markup π on the wages it pays.  The firm’s cost of labor includes a tax rate, τ.  
The firm must pay taxes into the training fund, whether or not it trains.  If the firm trains, it pays 
the post-training wage, ௜ܹ௧் for all t>0.  If the firm does not train, it pays workers a constant base 
wage,	 ଴ܹைfor all M  periods.  If the firm trains in period 0, it gets no output in period 0 but pays 
out the worker’s opportunity wage along with the tax levy, ଴ܹைሺ1 ൅ ߬ሻ.  The remaining terms 
incorporate firm-specific costs and benefits from training, where the direct cost of training is ܥ௜଴்,  
the training subsidy from the government is ௜ܵ଴், and the firm also earns an unobservable positive 
or negative incremental per worker return to training, ߝ௜் , that is known to the firm but not the 
econometrician.  The marginal return to training is  
డோ೔
డ்೔ ൌ 	 ௜ܰሺߨ െ ߬ሻሾሺ∑ ሺ
ଵ
ଵା௥ሻ௧ሻሺ ௜ܹ௧் െ ଴ܹைሻሿ	െ ௜ܰሺߨ ൅ 1ሻ ଴ܹை ൅	 ௜ܰሺ ௜ܵ଴்൅	ߝ௜் െ 	ܥ௜଴்ሻ୑௧ୀଵ 	0ழவ   (3) 
 If డோ೔డ்೔ ൐ 0, the firm should invest in training.  If negative, the firm will not train.  Factors 
that make డோ೔డ்೔ more positive will raise the probability of training.  To begin, we assume that 
8 
 
௧்ܹ ൐ ଴ܹை so that training raise worker productivity.5  It is also requires that ߨ ൐ ߬ so that the 
profit from raising a worker’s marginal product exceeds the taxes that would be paid on the 
resulting wage increases.  డோ೔డ்೔  becomes more positive and so likelihood of training increases with 
increases in the mark-up over wages ߨ, increases in the training subsidy ௜ܵ଴், increases in the 
productivity of training as proxied by the wage gap  ሺ ௜ܹ௧் െ ଴ܹைሻ, and increases in the 
unobserved profitability from training 	ߝ௜் .  The probability of training also increases with 
smaller tax levy imposed on the induced increase in wages, ߬; with smaller interest rates that 
reduce the present value of future returns to training, r; and with smaller training costs ܥ௜଴்.   
The theory demonstrates the potential problem with training funds that generate revenues 
through taxes on wages.  Training will raise wages and so the training fund policy taxes the 
return on training even as it lowers training costs.  There is no guarantee that the policy will raise 
aggregate training in the economy.  The training fund is most effective when firm’s face liquidity 
constraints as represented by high interest rates r.  The reason is that 
డమሺങೃ೔ങ೅೔ሻ					
డఛడ௥ ൐ 0:  the tax does 
not affect the present value of training as much when the firm is discounting the future more 
heavily.  However, if the constraints on liquidity are modest, the tax levy becomes more costly 
and the likelihood that the training fund increases probability of training diminsishes. 
 If the costs of training ܥ௜଴் and the subsidy ௜ܵ଴்	are constant and do not vary with firm size, 
equation (3) implies that there will be no size-bias in the incidence of training.  In other words, 
ܥ௜଴் and/or ௜ܵ଴் must be nonlinear in N to generate the size-bias we observe in the training data.  
                                                 
5 Training cannot lower productivity from the base level, but it is possible that the training adds no value so that 
௧்ܹ ൌ ଴ܹை.  In that case, the only reason the firm would engage in training is that the subsidy ௜ܵ଴் is so large that it 
fully compensates the firm for the lost production while the firm trains.   
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Either or both of the following specifications could generate the rising incidence of training as 
firm size increases 
ܥ௜଴் ൌ ௖బே೔ ൅ ܥሺ ௜ܰሻ; 	ܥ
ᇱሺ ௜ܰሻ ൑ 0                                                                          (4A) 
௜ܵ଴் ൌ ܵሺ ௜ܰሻ; ܵᇱሺ ௜ܰሻ ൒ 0                                                                                    (4B) 
 Equation (4A) suggests that firms face a fixed cost of participation due to paperwork 
involved in applying or validating the training and providing the required accounting to the 
government.  Average cost of training falls with the size of the firm because these fixed costs are 
spread over a larger number of trainees and also because there may be increasing returns to 
training such that C’<0.6  Even if the marginal cost of training is constant as ௜ܰ increases, there 
will be falling average cost of training as firm size rises.  As for ܵᇱሺ ௜ܰሻ ൒ 0, the requirement that 
the firm have a minimum number of trainees to qualify for a subsidy generates a subsidy that 
increases in N.7  
 The theory suggests that there should be rising incidence of training as firms increase in 
size, as the subsidy increases in value, as training costs decrease, and as wages rise relative to the 
untrained wage.  We test all these propositions in the next section. 
 
IV.  Empirical specification 
 The theory suggests two specifications.  The first treats training as a dichotomous 
variable.  Using (3), we infer that Ti =1 if    
ܫ ൌ ሺߨ െ ߬ሻሾሺ∑ ሺ ଵଵା௥ሻ௧ሻሺ ௜ܹ௧் െ ଴ܹைሻሿ	െሺߨ ൅ 1ሻ ଴ܹை ൅	 ௜ܵ଴் െ 	ܥ௜଴் ൐ െ	ߝ௜்୑௧ୀଵ   
                                                 
6 Black et al (1999) show that there are economies of scale in training that favor large firms. 
7 We can redefine Ti as training intensity such that 0 ൑ ௜ܶ ൑ 1.  That would make sense, for example, if firms 
invested between 0 and 100% of the workers time in the first period in training.  In that case, firms that train will 
invest optimally by setting డோ೔డ்೔ ൌ 	0 in (3).  For an interior solution, firms must face increasing costs of training or 
decreasing returns to training.   
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If we approximate the index function I(·) by its reduced form, we have   
Ti =1 if  ܫሺߨ, ௜ܹ௧் , ଴ܹை, ߬, ܥ௜଴், ௜ܵ଴், ௜ܰሻ ൐ െߝ௜்  
Ti =0 otherwise         (5) 
If the unobserved return to training ߝ௜் ~ܰሺ0,1ሻ, then (5) defines a probit equation.  If instead, we 
have a continuous measure of training intensity, as for example if Ti is measured as the training 
cost as a fraction of total compensation, then the reduced form will be 
௜ܶ ൌ ݂ሺߨ, ௜ܹ௧் , ଴ܹை, ߬, ܥ௜଴், ௜ܵ଴், ௜ܰ , ߝ௜் ሻ                                                                           (6) 
which we can approximate using ordinary least squares. 
 In our application, the training levy tax rate  ߬ is the same for all firms and we assume the 
markup over the wage ߨ is also fixed in expectation across firms.  The base wage ଴ܹை should 
also be the same across firms in the same industry.  Mauritius is a small island economy, and so 
it is logical to assume that worker mobility will equalize sectoral base wages throughout the 
island.  Consequently, sectoral variation in ଴ܹை can be controlled using sector-specific dummy 
variables.  The remaining observable explanatory variables in (5) and (6) that vary across firms 
include ௜ܹ௧் , ܥ௜଴், 	 ௜ܵ଴், and	 ௜ܰ.   
 
IV.  Data 
 Our data source is an administrative data set that includes training levy, firm size and 
firm sector information for the universe of all registered firms in Mauritius in 2007.  The data set 
also includes accounting data for about 30 % of the firms in 2007.  The data are sufficient to 
allow us to approximate the information we need to evaluate the determinants of training in 
Mauritius. 
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Endogenous Variables 
 We have two measures of Ti available in the data set: 
Training Incidence: A dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm trained in 2007.  Only 9% of the 
firms reported training expenditures in 2007. 
Training Intensity:  The log of total training expenditures per employee in 2007. This measure 
presumes that when a large firm only trains a single worker, that represents a less intensive 
training investment than if a small firm trains its lone employee. 
Exogenous Variables 
The key regressors we require are measures of firm wages, training costs and the 
anticipated subsidy.  The Mauritius administrative data did not include individual wages or the 
wage bill for the firm.  However, it did include a measure of the aggregate training levy paid by 
the firm.  Regardless of whether they train or not, each firm pays the training levy used to 
subsidize firm training.  The levy is proportional to the firm’s base wage bill which is total 
compensation excluding overtime, bonuses and benefits.  That means that the training levy 
߬ ௜ܰ పܹതതത where τ is the tax rate, ௜ܰ is the number of firm employees, and పܹതതത is the average wage in 
the firm in year t.  In log form, ln ቀఛே೔ௐഢതതതതே೔ ቁ ൌ lnሺ߬ పܹതതതሻ ൌ lnሺ߬ሻ ൅ lnሺ పܹതതതሻ.  In regressions, the effect 
of the tax rate will be captured in the constant term.  Because sector dummies controls for 
variation in ଴ܹை, the coefficient on lnሺ߬ పܹതതതሻ is interpretable as the elasticity of training with 
respect to ሺ ௜்ܹ െ ଴ܹைሻ, a proxy of the anticipated return to training.   
 The Mauritius administrative data provide information on the total cost of training 
including firm payments and the government subsidy for all firms that participate in the program.  
We compute an average cost per hour of training by dividing firm payments plus subsidies 
divided by the total hours of training across all trainees in the firm.  To create an expected cost of 
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training for each firm, we divided the data into 9 industrial sectors.  Each sector was further 
subdivided into the three firm size groups defined in Table 1.  The average training cost per hour 
for participating firms in each of the 27 cells is used as the expected training cost, ܥ௜଴்.  We use 
the log form of this measure.   
 We use a similar strategy to estimate the expected subsidy in each of the 27 cells.  For 
each company receiving a subsidy in 2007, we compute the ratio of training grants received by 
the company to the firm’s total expenditures on training.  A small fraction of firms had ratios 
greater than 1.  Since firms should only get back a fraction of their training costs, we expect this 
value to be less than one, and therefore set any values greater than one to one. Expected subsidy 
is the mean subsidy per across all training firms of this measure by sector and firm size cell.  
Because these values vary between zero and one we left these as rates rather than converting to 
logs.8  
 A large literature suggests that there is more need for training in larger firms with more 
complex production processes and internal labor markets.9  In addition, returns to scale in 
training may give larger firms a cost advantage in training provision (Black et al, 1999).  Our 
firm size measure is total employment ௜ܰ଴ in log form.   
Capital and skill are presumed to be complements in production, and so training is 
believed to be most important in firms with more complex production processes.  Therefore, we 
include a measure of firm capital Κio to control for heterogeneity in training needs across firms. 
                                                 
8 As many of the values are close to zero, taking the log led to very large negative values for some and values close 
to zero for others, and so the log tended to exaggerate outliers.  In addition, because for numbers close to zero, 
ln(1+x)→x, leaving these values in rates did not depart much from the log transformation applied to the other 
measures. 
9 Doeringer and Piore (1985) showed how firm size led to the creation of internal labor markets, increased firm 
training, and lower worker mobility.  Oi and Idson’s (1999) review of the literature shows that worker mobility is 
inversely related to firm size..  Black et al (1999) show that the incidence of training rises with firm size because 
large firms have a cost advantage in offering training.  Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999) argue that asymmetric 
information on worker productivity leads to worker immobility that increases firm incentive to train.  The 
asymmetric information they discuss is likely to be more important in large firms. 
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We only have capital asset measures for 4013 firms and so we use the log of the mean value per 
firm in each sector and firm size cell as the common measure for all firms in the cell.   
V.  Results:  Training incidence and intensity 
 We report two specifications of the training equation in Table 2.10  The results are quite 
consistent with one another, whether training is measured as a dichotomous variable or as a per 
worker investment.  The results are also consistent with the theoretical predictions implied by 
equation (3): factors that raise the expected net return on training increase the likelihood that the 
firm invests.  Noting that sector-specific dummy variables are used to fix the value of the base 
wage ଴ܹை,  a 10% increase in the post-training wage relative to the base wage raises the 
probability of training by 4.8%.  Recall that in the Becker framework, the firm’s return to 
training is proportional to ሺ ௜ܹ௧் െ ଴ܹைሻ, and so higher worker returns in the form of higher wages 
signal that the firm is making a higher return as well. 
 The other factors that should raise the returns to training also increase the incentives to 
train.  Firm size and capital intensity both have strong positive effects on firm training 
probability and intensity.  Ten percent increases in firm size and capital stock both raise the 
probability of offering training by 1%.  All of these findings are consistent with a standard model 
of firm investment in on-the-job training.   
 Interestingly, expected training costs do not significantly affect the probability of 
training.  That suggests that expected training costs are not an impediment to training, casting 
doubt on the justification of the training fund.  
                                                 
10 The goodness of fit is low, but our dependent variable is whether the firm invested in training in one particular 12 
month period rather than the more theoretically appropriate measure which would be whether the firm ever engaged 
in training.  We note that 20% of Mauritius firms train, but only 9% of them trained during our one-year window, an 
indication of considerable noise in the dependent variable.  However, with the huge sample size, we were able to 
derive reasonable coefficients despite the noisy training indicators.  
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 And yet the probability of training is quite sensitive to the expected subsidy in their 
sector/firm size cell.  The large elasticity implies that relatively small subsidies greatly expand 
interest in training, holding constant factors that should increase returns to training.  On the 
margin, firms that would not have invested in training without the training fund do invest with 
the promise of training subsidies.  Without the subsidy, training would be concentrated in the 
largest, capital intensive firms with the most rapidly rising wage profiles. 
 None of the industry dummy variables are statistically significant individually or jointly.  
Outside the incentive offered by the subsidy, there is no evidence that the government favors one 
sector over another.  Because training was supposed to target information technologies, these 
results suggest that the apparent bias toward information technology firms we observed in Table 
1 exists because those firms have a greater need to train even without the training fund and not 
because the training fund is atypically raising training incentives for information technology 
firms.  
 The question remains as to whether the training fund increases the incidence of training 
through the subsidy or lowers the incidence of training because of the tax.  The consistent pattern 
of tax levy receipts exceeding disbursements seen in Figure 2 suggests that the nete effect may 
be to reduce training.  We add additional evidence to that effect next.  
VI.  Results:  Cross-subsidization in the Mauritius training fund 
 While the evidence from Table 2 suggests that firms would respond elastically to the 
issuance of training subsidies if the program were made more easily available, we have not 
documented whether the training fund reallocates from some firms and toward others.  Table 3 
divides the firms into the 27 firm size by industry cells.  For each cell, we compute the total 
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training levy paid by firms in the cell, the total subsidies received by firms in the cell, and the 
ratio of the benefits received to the taxes paid.  Ratios above one indicate that the cell group 
received more in benefits than it paid in taxes while ratios less than one indicate the cell paid 
more in taxes than it received in training subsidies.11  We also report the fraction of firms in each 
cell that engaged in training.  
 The results show a surprising result:  the pattern of cross subsidization is from large to 
small firms.  While small firms are not likely to train in the absence of the training fund, small 
firms receive more in training subsidies than they pay in taxes.  The cross subsidization from 
large to small firms occurs in every sector.  The largest ratios are not the targeted information 
sectors, but rather agriculture, wholesale and retail trade and transportation.   
 Moving up the size distribution, intermediate sized firms are more likely than small firms 
to invest in training, but only in information technology is the ratio of subsidy to training levy 
larger than it was for the smallest firm.  Finance, hotels and information technology are the three 
sectors that received more in subsidy than they paid in taxes. 
 Curiously, it is the largest firms that should have the greatest incentive to train without 
the subsidy, but they are atypically taxed to subsidize the firms with the least natural inclination 
to train.  In every sector but Finance, the ratio of benefits to taxes paid is lower for the largest 
firms than for the intermediate or small firms.  Yet it is these largest firms that have the highest 
propensity to train in every sector.   
 Combining the inference derived from Tables 2 and 3, it seems clear that the Mauritius 
training fund alters firm incentives to train but it does so by taxing the firms with the 
comparative advantage in training in order to subsidize the firms with the least to gain from 
training.  Coupled with the finding in Figure 2 that the training fund takes in more in taxes than it 
                                                 
11 We also computed cell values in per worker and per firm terms.  The ratios were virtually identical. 
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pays out in subsidies, it seems that the net effect may well be to lower the returns to training for 
large firms through the tax more than it lowers the marginal cost of training as would be the case 
if the presumed liquidity constraints on large firms were not severe.  It does raise the incidence 
of training in the smallest firms that may indeed face liquidity constraints on training.  Whether 
this is a general pattern of training funds in developing countries that tax firm returns to training 
in order to generate funds used for training subsidies is unclear, but the Mauritian policy is not 
dissimilar to the most commonly used training funds in Africa and Latin America.  Our results 
suggest that the policy may be counter-productive. 
VII.  Results:  Training effects on firm output and growth 
 We have only limited ability to examine whether training actually raise labor 
productivity, and so we offer these estimates as suggestive.  Training intensive firms should have 
higher current productivity and should have greater potential for future growth.  We embed the 
firm’s training investment in a standard Cobb Douglas production function. 
݈݊ܳ௜௧ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙ௄݈݊ܭ௜௧ ൅ ߙே݈݊ ௜ܰ௧ ൅ ߙ்݈݊ ௜ܶ ൅ ௜ܺ௧ᇱ ߚ ൅ ߝ௜௧                          (7) 
Our measure of output is total revenue reported in 2007.  For this application, we need to use the 
actual capital measure and so we can only estimate the production function for about one-third of 
the firms.  For this application, we use the continuous measure of training, ln ௜ܶ, as defined by the 
right-hand columns in Table 2.  Note that we need to use predicted values of training to generate 
an expected level of training given the firm’s observable attributes.  The reason is that any one 
year’s training level measures the long-run level of training investment with considerable error 
due to random labor turnover that changes the fraction of employees requiring training from one 
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year to the next.  The predicted training level will reflect the long term relationships between 
firm attributes, taxes subsidies, and propensities to train.  
 Training may not just change current output but it may change the pace of firm growth. If 
true, then the training effect may be better captured by equations of the form  
 ݈݊ ொ೔೟శభொ೔೟ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛ௄݈݊ܭ௜௧ ൅ ߛே݈݊ ௜ܰ௧ ൅ ߛ்݈݊ ௜ܶ ൅ ௜ܺ௧
ᇱ ߠ ൅ ߳௜௧                           (8) 
Equation (8) is estimated using two alternative outcome measures:  
Log Wage Bill Growth: The difference in logarithms of the total levy paid between 2007 and 
2008 will be proportional to the growth in the wage bill.  We use 2007 measures of capital, labor 
and training as regressors.  
Log Employment Growth: The difference in logarithms of the number of employees between 
2007 and 2008.  
 We report these regressions in Table 4.  The production function estimates suggest that a 
10 percent increase in training intensity increases current output by 4.2 percent.  However, 
training does not appear to affect growth in the wage bill or employment, suggesting that training 
does not alter the growth prospects of firms.   More definitive conclusions would require a longer 
longitudinal record on training and nontraining firms to see if our cross-sectional production 
function estimates hold up over longer horizons.  However, these results suggest that the benefits 
of the training are largely confined to the firm providing the training and that the program does 
not generate positive externalities that spread to other firms not receiving training subsidies that 
might raise the growth rate of the economy as a whole.   
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VIII. Conclusions and recommendations 
 The Mauritius training program is aimed at encouraging firm training by imposing a levy 
on all firms and then reimbursing them a percentage of the expenses paid for some types of 
training. The levy is based on the firm’s wage bill, meaning that the largest taxes are paid by 
firms with the most employees and/or that pay the highest wages, the firms that have the highest 
return to training in the absence of the program. The tax lowers incentive to train, even as the 
subsidy raises the incentive to train.  Our results show that the factors that should increase the 
incentives to train in the absence of the training fund behave as expected and that training costs 
do not serve as an impediment to training.  While the subsidies do raise the likelihood of training 
for firms that would not have trained otherwise, the greatest effect is on the smallest firms.  As a 
result, the program disproportionately taxes the largest and most capital intensive firms that 
would be most likely to train without the program, and disproportionately benefits the smallest 
firms that would have the least incentives to train. 
 One problem is that the training subsidies target general skills such as those provided by 
domestic of foreign training firms and graduate programs and not training provided on-the-job or 
in-house.  Evaluations in both developed and developing countries have found greater benefits 
from on-the-job training rather than the classroom training favored by the Mauritius training 
fund.   
 If the performance of the training fund is to be improved, it should target the type of 
training that is most useful in its absence – training specific to the firm.  If more general skills are 
to be offered, it may be useful to follow the sectoral training model used in Europe in which the 
firms within a specific sector pool resources to invest in skills uniquely required by firms in the 
sector with the government serving in a coordinating role.   
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 However, another option is to eliminate the training fund program altogether.  As shown 
in the theory, the training fund is most effective when there are liquidity constraints on firms.  
There is no evidence that the largest and most capital intensive firms in Mauritius suffer from 
liquidity constraints, and as a result, theory predicts that the negative incentive effects of the tax 
outweigh the positive effects of the subsidy.  As a result, the training fund may well lower the 
overall incidence of training, consistent with the result in Figure 2 that the program takes in more 
in taxes than in pays out in subsidies.  It is virtually certain that there are alternate uses of these 
public funds that would produce a better return. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of training by type and location of trainer, Mauritius Training Fund, FY2005-2009  
 
Source:  Authors’ compilation of data provided by the Mauritius Human Resource Development Council. 
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Figure 2:   Tax Levy Receipts and Disbursements (in million Mauritian rupees) of the Mauritius Human Resource Development 
Council’s Training Grant System, FY1989-2010 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ compilation of data provided by the Mauritius Human Resource Development Council. 
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Table 1: Averages of firm propensity to train by sector and firm size, Mauritius, 2007/2008. 
 
Sector 
Small 
1-9 workers 
Medium 
10-50  workers 
Large 
>50 workers 
Overall means
Total 6.4% 14.3% 29.0% 9.1% 
  Sector     
Agriculture 5.8% 10.4% 33.3% 8.2% 
Manufacturing and   
 Textiles                  6.2% 10.9% 28.0% 10.3% 
Wholesale and retail 6.2% 11.0% 40.7% 8.0% 
Community, social and 
 other services 6.7% 17.3% 29.5% 9.2% 
Construction 5.4% 9.1% 27.5% 7.2% 
Finance 10.2% 25.7% 29.3% 14.9% 
Hotels 5.6% 15.4% 25.6% 9.2% 
Information technology 7.4% 23.9% 46.7% 13.6% 
Transport 6.5% 17.1% 22.9% 8.4% 
    
     
Sample size  13403    
Source: Authors’ computation based on the Mauritius training and firm characteristics data set, 2007.  
Note: These are firms that either trained only in 2007 or in 2007 and 2008. Firms that trained only in 2008 were excluded from this analysis.  
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Table 2: Regressions explaining training intensity and training probability  
 Training Incidence Training Intensity 
 
Marginal 
effect 
Standard 
error 
 
Elasticity
Maginal 
effect 
Standard 
error 
 
Elasticity
Log average wage ln( ௜்ܹ )  0.055*** 0.02 0.61 0.483** 0.20 0.48 
Expected subsidy  ( ௜ܵ଴்) 0.258* 0.15 2.84 2.919* 1.52 1.53 
Log expected training cost ln(ܥ௜଴்) -0.001 0.005 -0.01 -0.024 0.05 -0.02 
Log number of employees  ln( ௜ܰ) 0.022*** 0.003 0.24 0.123*** 0.03 0.12 
Log Capital  0.008** 0.004 0.09 0.092*** 0.04 0.09 
Sector       
Agriculture -0.003 0.02  -0.115 0.18  
Manufacturing and textiles 0.003 0.01  0.008 0.08  
Wholesale and retail -0.004 0.01  -0.042 0.07  
Community, social and other services 0.001 0.01  -0.045 0.09  
Construction -0.014 0.01  -0.131 0.10  
Finance -0.025 0.02  -0.227 0.21  
Hotels -0.010 0.01  -0.146 0.11  
Information technology 0.006 0.02  0.166 0.19  
Constant    -5.434*** 1.51  
R2      0.02   0.06   
Sample size 13403   13392   
Source: Authors’ computation based on the Mauritius training and firm characteristics data set, 2007/2008 
Notes: * significant at 10 percent **significant at 5 percent ***significant at 1 percent 
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Table 3: Total training levies paid and subsidies received in 2007, by firm size and sector cells, in million Mauritian rupees. 
 
 Small 1-9 workers Medium 10-50 workers Large >50 workers 
  
(1) 
Levy 
(2) 
Subsidy 
(2)/(1) 
Ratio 
Ratio 
that  
Trained*
(1) 
Levy 
(2) 
Subsidy 
(2)/(1) 
ratio 
Ratio 
that  
trained*
(1) 
Levy 
(2) 
Subsidy 
(2)/(1) 
ratio 
Ratio 
that  
Trained*
Agriculture 0.94 4.71 5.01 0.07 2.31 1.51 0.65 0.12 14.3 1.99 0.14 0.40 
Manufacturing and 
textiles 2.66 4.83 1.82 0.08 8.28 7.88 0.95 0.14 40.3 14.10 0.35 0.41 
Wholesale and retail 3.24 10.30 3.18 0.09 4.06 2.97 0.73 0.14 11.4 3.10 0.27 0.51 
Community, social 
and other services 3.4 9.02 2.65 0.08 5.62 3.72 0.66 0.21 11.9 3.60 0.30 0.35 
Construction 1.86 2.59 1.39 0.07 4.07 2.49 0.61 0.12 11.6 2.39 0.21 0.37 
Finance 3.3 6.93 2.10 0.13 6.07 6.17 1.02 0.32 22.2 70.10 3.16 0.43 
Hotels 1.69 4.07 2.41 0.08 3.35 4.47 1.33 0.20 32.1 8.65 0.27 0.41 
Information 
technology 0.98 1.67 1.71 0.12 1.92 10.70 5.57 0.31 3.39 0.62 0.18 0.60 
Transport 6.86 24.60 3.59 0.08 10 16.00 1.60 0.20 24.3 5.88 0.24 0.34 
Source: Authors’ computation based on the Mauritius training and firm characteristics data set, 2007.  
*Ratio that trained : number of firms that trained as a fraction of  total number of firms in each sector.  
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Table 4: Regressions explaining various measures of firm output and growth using predicted 
intensity of training 
Variables 
Log 
output 
 
Log wage bill growth
Log employment 
growth 
 Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Log capital  0.076*** 0.007 0.020 0.015 0.039*** 0.009 
Predicted intensity of  
training  0.417* 0.241 0.061 0.105 0.027 0.064 
Log number of 
employees 0.716*** 0.060 0.042** 0.018 -0.076*** 0.011 
Sector       
Agriculture -0.554*** 0.164 -0.137*** 0.052 -0.095*** 0.032 
Manufacturing and 
textiles -0.656*** 0.076 0.018 0.025 0.058*** 0.015 
Wholesale and retail -0.287*** 0.063 0.037* 0.022 0.006 0.014 
Community, social and 
other services -0.751*** 0.081 0.022 0.025 -0.036** 0.015 
Construction -0.364*** 0.100 0.106*** 0.037 0.073*** 0.023 
Finance -0.926*** 0.140 0.096** 0.041 0.009 0.025 
Hotels -0.976*** 0.076 0.029 0.037 -0.009 0.022 
Information technology -0.623*** 0.139 0.162** 0.069 0.132*** 0.043 
Constant 13.308*** 0.120 0.182 0.181 -0.503*** 0.111 
R2 0.47  0.01  0.03  
Sample size 4013  10563  10562  
Source: Authors’ computation based on the Mauritius training and firm characteristics data set, 2007.  
Notes: * significant at 10 percent **significant at 5 percent ***significant at 1 percent  
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Appendix 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean 
 2007 2008 
Firm characteristics 
Percentage trained 11.93 6.64 
Number of Employees  20.97 20.64 
Grants received (conditional on training)  
(thousand  rupees) 154.72 
 
99.89 
Grants received (unconditional)  
(thousand  rupees) 18.46 
 
6.63 
Levies paid (thousand  rupees) 18.06 18.23 
Accounting Data (million rupees)   
Sales in 2007 45.90 33.00 
Cost of Capital 19.30 18.80 
Fraction of firms in   
Agriculture 0.08 0.07 
Manufacturing and textiles 0.14 0.14 
Wholesale and retail 0.13 0.29 
Community, social and other services 0.14 0.14 
Construction 0.08 0.08 
Finance 0.05 0.06 
Hotels 0.07 0.07 
Information technology 0.02 0.02 
Transport  0.28 0.11 
Source: Authors’ computation based on the Mauritius training and firm characteristics data set, 2007.  
 
